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Abstract
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answer of Ramsey [11], that savings is optimal if it maximizes the integral of utility over time subject to the
national income constraint, has guided research in the area for half a century. Recently this dominion of
utilitarianism has come under scrutiny. Mirrlees, for instance, has shown how Ramsey's rule breaks down in
the presence of technical change and population growth. Moreover, if the scope of the question is not merely
efficiency but also justice, the whole framework of utility maximization may be indefensible. Thus, Rawls in
his theory of justice remarks!
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1. Introduction
One of the central issues of welfare macroeconomics is, How much ought
I
a nation to save? .The classic answer of Ramsey [11], that savings is optimal
if it maximizes the integral of utility over time subject to the national
income constraint, has guided research in the area for half a century.
Recently this dominion of utilitarianism has come under scrutiny. Mirrlees
[7], for instance, has shown how Ramsey's rule breaks down in the presence
of technical change and population growth. Moreover, if the scope of the
question is not merely efficiency but also justice, the whole framework of
utility maximization may be indefensible. Thus, Rawls in his theory of
justice remarks!
...it seems evident, for example, that the classical principle
of utility leads in the wrong direction for questions of justice
between generations...maximizing total utility may lead to an
excessive rate of accumulation (at least in the near future)... the
utilitarian doctrine may direct us to demand heavy sacrifices of
the poorer generations for the sake of greater advantages for the
later ones that are far better off. But this calculus of advantages
which balances the losses of some against benefits to othersj appears
even less justified in the case of generations than among conten^o-
raries. Even if we cannot define a precise just savings principle,
we should be able to aviod this sort of extreme. [12, pp. 286-7].
While Rawls does not explicitly define a just savings principle, a number of
recent economic studies have explored the implications of Rawls overall posi
tion. Ordover [7] and Ordover and Phelps [8] consider optimal taxation of
wages, wealth, and interest in a steady-state economy which satisfies £lawl's
difference principle. The major drawback of these papers is their assumption
of a steady-state, which leaves aside the important issue of how the steady
state should be reached; and if there are multiple steady states, which one
should be reached.
This latter set of issues, of direct relevance to the theory of saving,
has also received attention [1, 3, 13, 14, 2, 4]. The literature so far has
applied Rawls' difference principle for contemporaries to the intergenerational
context. Thus, Arrow has shown [1] that there is no net capital accumulation
in a Rawlsian savings program so formulated, as long as intergenerational
altruism is sufficiently limited (for results in similar vein, see Dasgupta
[3]). Riley [13] and Riley and Phelps [14] have shown that more extensive
altruism or overlapping generations are sufficient to ensure a positive net
capital accumulation. Calvo [2] has extended the difference principle model
to the case of an uncertain technology. Grout [4] has discussed the model
from the point of view of g^e theory. This literature however faces the
problem that Rawls explicitly rejects the maximin welfare function as apply
ing to the question of justice between generations:
It is now clear why the difference principle does not apply
to the savings problem. There is no way for later generations to
improve the situation of the least fortunate first generation.
The principle is inapplicable and it would seem to imply, if
anything, that there be no saving at all. Thus, the problem of
saving must be treated in another fashion. [12, p. 291]
This paper, then, attempts to construct a just savings principle on a
theoretical level that corresponds to Rawls' own suggestions "at a more
primitive level" [10, p. 286]. In the next section the savings problem is
modeled as a optimal control problem. The major differences between the
Rawlsian solution and utilitarian solutions turn out to correspond to
differences in the objective function and the space of admissible controls.
The third section discusses the Ramsey case of no technological progress
and no population growth. Here are proved both the existence of a just
savings path and a characterization of the essentially unique just path.
The fourth section extends these results to the case of population growth
and technological change; the results here can be contrasted to those of
Mirrlees. The fifth section compares numerically Rawsian and utilitarian
paths. Unanswered questions and further issues are raised in the conclusion.
2. Model and Interpretations
We first present the stationary state model. Let k(t) be the capital
stock at time t«
Output y(t) is a function of the capital stock,
(1) y(t) = f(k(t)).
We assume that the production function has f(k) > 0 for k > 0 and f > 0.
Denote by"u(t) the average saving rate at time t. Obviously,
(2) 0 ^ u(t) £ 1 .
The rate of investment, k(t), is given by
(3) k(t) = u(t) y(t)
There is no depreciation of capital. Initial capital stock at time 0 is
given by
(4) k(0) = k^ > 0.
The target capital stock at time T is given by the interval
(5) k(T) e [k'^ , k""^].
Here k™^ is the capital accumulated if u(t) = 1 throughout the time period
[0, T] ; k*, the minimum allowable accumulated capital, k* is assumed to be
greater than k^. Taking k(t) as the state variable and u(t) as the control
variable, the objective of the problem is to minimize the maximum control,
(6) min max u(t)
t
subject to (1) - (5).
Some discussion of this framework (in particular (5) and (6)) is in
order, since it is not obvious that the control problem answers to lUwlsian
principles. Now Rawls says:
It is also characteristic of the contract doctrine to define
a just state of society at which the entire course of accumulation
aims.. This feature derives from the fact that an ideal conception
of a just basic structure is embedded in the principles chosen in -
the original position. In this respect, justice and fairness conr
trasts with utilitarian views. The just savings principle can be
regarded as an understanding between generations to carry their
fair share of the burden of realizing and preserving a just
society. The end of the savings process is set up in advance,
although only the general outlines can be discerned.
...Of course, the just savings principle applies to what
a society is to save as a matter of justice. If men wish to
save for various grand projects, that is another matter. [12,
pp." 288-9].
On this interpretation, then, k* is the capital stock required for a "just
state of society," while the interval in (5) allows for saving "for various
grand projects."
The objective function (6) derives first of all from the idea that
savings, since it is a burden, ought to be somehow minimized. The special
form of (6) can be grounded on further Rawlsian principles, in particular,
the general conception of justice.
All social values...are to be distributed equally unless an
unequal distribution of any, or all, of these values is to every
one's advantage. [12, p. 62].
This would seen to apply also to a disvalue like saving. But the conception
only applies if there is a relevant feature for which equality is even possi
ble. It is obvious that utility ordinarily is not such a feature, since the
richer later generations will be better off. [See, however, [13] and [14]
for cases where utility can be equal.] Again, it would be possible to have
k the same for all generations, but this would seem to impose a much greater
burden on the poorer generations. Here, Rawls says:
• Thus the persons in the original position are to ask them
selves how much they would be willing to save at each stage of
advance on the assumption that all other generations are to save
at the same rates. That is, they are to consider their willing
ness to save at any given phase of civilization with the under
standing that the rates they propose are to regulate the whole
span of accumulation... In effect, then, they must choose a just
savings principle that assigns an appropriate rate of accumula
tion to each level of advance. Presumably this rate changes
depending upon the state of society. When people are poor and
saving is difficult, a lower rate of saving should be required;
whereas in a wealthier society greater savings may reasonably be
expected since the real burden is less. [12, p. 287].
Thus, if k is the rate of accumulation, then (6) says that the maximum "real
burden," k(t)/y(t), is to be minimized.
Finally, as far as the finite terminal time T is concerned, Rawls
remarks:
But in any event we are not bound to go on maximizing
indefinitely. Indeed, it is for this reason that the savings
principle is agreed to after the principles of justice for
institutions, even though this principle constrains the differ
ence principle. These principles tell us what to strive for.
The savings principle represents an interpretation, arrived at
in the original position, of the previously accepted natural
duty to uphold and further just institutions. In this case the
ethical problem is that of agreeing on a path over time which
treats all generations justly during the whole course of society's
history. [12, p. 289].
Indeed, from the standpoint of the priority of justice, the just state ought
not,to be postponed indefinitely. As far as society after time T is concerned,
Rawls offers the possible interpretation "of the ideal society as one whose
econoTiy is in a steady state of growth (possible zero); and which is at the
same time just." [12, p. 286]. Still, one might not be willing to commit
to a fixed time interval of length T, even in the original position. Thus,
if T itself belongs to an interval [Tq, T^] of lengths, one satisfies a
final Rawlsian dictum:
Now I believe that it is not possible, at present anyway, to
define precise limits on what the rate of savings should be. How
the burden of capital accumulation and of raising the standard of
civilization and culture is to be shared between generations seems
to admit of no definite answer. It does not follow, however, that
certain bounds which impose significant ethical constraints cannot
be formulated. [12, p. 286].
Our justification for the control problem (l)-(6) comes down to this.
As far as we can see, it is consistent with what Rawls says about just saving.
Even if Rawls' entire theory were mistaken, the control problem would still
account for just savings in other theories, for exaiiq)le, intuitionist. In
either event, the framework is a definite alternative to all forms of
utilitarianism.
It will prove useful to extend the model to account for population growth
and technological change. Specifically, let population grow at a constant
rate n and let there be Harrod-neutral technological progress at constant rate
a. Now interpret k(t) e y(t) as the capital-labor ratio and output-labor
ratio in efficiency labor units, respectively. Amending equation (3) to (3'),
to describe the law of motion of k.(t) :
(3*) k = u f(k) - (n + a)k
completes the extension.
Finally, we shall need utilitarian versions of the control problem:
r"
(6') max L(t) U(c(t))dt
0
subject to (3) or (3') and (4)
where L(t) is population at time t, c(t) is per capita consumption, and U is
the instantaneous utlity function. The endpoint restriction on capital is
lifted. In the Ramsey case, L(t) = 1 and n = a = 0. In the Mirrlees case,
L(t) = and n + a S 0. In case the integral (6') is not defined, the
overtaking principle replaces it. Thus, utility stream is better than
if for all t large enough.
L(t) U. dt >
0 ^
L(t) U dt.
0
3. Just Saving in a Stationary Economy
This section analyzes the control problem
min max u(t)
t
(I) subject to
(2) k « u f(k)
(3) 0 ^ u(t) ^ 1
(4) k(0) = k^ fixed
(5) k(l) s [k*,
Our principal result is the following.
Theorem 1. There exists a solution to control problem (I). The solution is
essentially unique, and is characterized as being a constant control leading
from k to k* in time T.
o
Proof. Let k(T) » k e [k*,
Integrating (2), one has
(7)
k • ^0
O
u<t) dt.
but the integral on the left-hand side is simply a positive constant depending
on k, denoted c(k).
Consider the problem
mln
subject to (7)
where the norm is taken in the sense of space. We show the solution to this
control problem also solves control problem (I).
By the minimum norm duality theorem [6, Theorem 2, Corollary 1, pp. 123-4],
there exists a control of minimum norm, u*(t), such that
(8) [ u* I 1 * max c(^b
S.T. II b II si
u
8the norm on the right-hand side being taken in L^. Thus, the minimum norm
has the value
c(k) • 1 >—, since 1 ^ b dt.
Moreover, the control of minimum norm is aligned with the constant function
^ on the interval [0, T]; which means that
(9) u*(t) = K[sgn = K, for some constant K,
(8) and(9) together imply that the optimal control u*(t) =^4^ >^ constant.
The solution is essentially unique, in the sense that any optimal
solution differs from u* only on a set of measure zero. [Lebesgue measure
on [0, T) is meant throughout.] The minimum norm control obviously satisfies
0 ^ u*(t), so it remains to show that u*(t) £ 1; then u* is optimal for the
target k.
To see this, note that c'(k) = > 0, so c(k) is strictly increasing.
By the definition of c(k"^*) = T. This c(k) < cCk"*^) = T, and so
u* =^< 1.
Finally, by the montomicity of c(k), the optimal control for problem (I)
is given by
(10) u*(t) - I
.k*
dk
k •
Notice that the just savings rate decreases as the time span T increases,
while the just savings rate increases as k* increases. Notice also that
computing the just savings path will in practice be a much sin^ler matter than
computing any utilitarian path, since only the evaluation of the integral
in (10) is involved.
4. Just Saving In a Growing Economy
In this section we extend the analysis of the previous section to economies
that are capable of growth. The control problem now becomes
mln max u(t)
t
(II) subject to
(2') ic = u f(k) - (n + a)k
(3) 0 u(t) ^ 1
(4) k(0) = fixed
(5) k(t) e [k*,
Our principal result of the last section immediately generalizes as:
Theorem. 2. There exists a solution to control problem (II). The solution is
essentially unique, and is characterized as being a constant control leading
from k to k* in time T.
o
Proof. By a well-known result in control theory [5, Theorem 4, Corollary 2,
p« 262], there exists an optimal control.
Let U be the set of all controls, the application of which makes k(T)
reach the target interval. A control u e U is inadmissible if there exists
another control u e U, such that
u(t) £ u(t) all t
u(t) < u(t) on a set t of positive measure.
If there exists no such control, then u is admissible. Let U„ C U be the set
c
of constant controls, and cp(t, u) = k(t) be the solution of (2') for u c U^.
We show that
(12) ^ > 0
Su
when the initial value (4) is fixed. Applying a well-known result in differ
ential equations [10, Theorem 17, p. 197], ^ satisfies the linear differential
ou
equation
10
(13) ("f - (n +a)) f H-f
With initial value (t , u) = 0, where f and f are evaluated at (p(t, u).
du o
Solving (13), one has
.(14) ^ (t, u)=
pt — A
f exp -
^t
uf - (n +a)dtj dt
the right hand side of which is clearly positive. In particular,
") > 0: thus the constant control in U- that leads to k* is
du ou ^
minimal with respect to U_. Denoting the above control by u*, we claim that
u
u* is admissible for all U. For, suppose that u* is not admissible. Then
there exists u e U, u(t) ^ u* everywhere and u(t) < u(t) on a non-negligible
set S. Let (t^, t^) be the first open interval found in S. On (t^, t^) it
is clear that k(u) < k(u*) and since k(u) is never greater than k(u*)
.T
0
k(u) =
k(u*) +
k(u) + k(u) +
[0, T] - S
k(u*) = k* - k
[0, T] - (t^, t^)
k(ID
s - (t^, tp
so that u ^U, a contradiction. It is further evident by the preceding
inequality that a constant control which is admissible is minimax.
Remark. Theorem 2 obviously contains Theorem 1 as a special case, with
n + a = 0. However, Theorem 1 is easier to prove and perhaps gains in insight,
Further, unlike the case in Theorem 1, one can give no explicit rule for calcu
lating the minimax policy here, since the accumulation equation (2') may be
computationally intractable.
11
5. Simple Examples
It is worthwhile seeing what minimax savings paths look lilce in fairly
orthodox settins, if only to compare them to utilitarian alternatives. We
consider two examples, one involving a stationary econoiry, the other, an
economy with growing population and technical progress.
Example 1. Let the production function be f(k) =k^, 0 < b < 1. Since
the econony is stationary, (10) applies and the minimax savings rate is given
by
u*(t) = i
1^1-b , 1-b
„k* , k* - k
k"^ dk =
k
o
Substituting in (2) and solving, the time path of capital is given by
(15) k(t) =
Table 1 sets out the savings paths (15) for b ranging from .25 to .75, when
k = 4, k* = 8, and T = 100. The paths are very much alike, despite the
o
great differences in the technology. In table 2 is shown the dependence of
the minimax savings rate on various values of (k*, T) for k^ = 4 and b = ,25.
The savings rate is never above 7.5%, nor does it change dramatically in
response to changes in the target stock or accumulation period. For higher
b, minimax savings rates follow the general pattern of table 2, but somewhat
lower. A reasonable rate, averaging all these cases, would appear to be
about 3%.
Con^jare these results to a utilitarian path with the same parameter
values, the objective now being to maximize (6') with instantaneous utility
function
(16) u(c) = -c
Consun^tion c is given by the equation
12
(17) c(t) = f(k(t)) - k(t).
By Ramsey's rule, there exists a constant B such that optimal k satisfies
(18) k = = c
the last equality following from (16) and the fact that the bliss point B is
zero. Substituting (17) into (18), one has that
(19) k=f(k(t))/2.
In other words, Ramsey's rule here requires a constant savings rate of 50%
forever. Obviously, a large capital is bound to accumulate. For instance,
k(lOO) ranges from 138 for b = ,25 up to 37483 for b = .75. Utilitarianism
thus places a much heavier savings burden on the present generationj for the
benefit of later generations that inherit the accumulated capital.
Example 2. (Steady-State Case). Again the production function is
f(k) = k^, 0 < b < 1, where k is the capital-labor ration Such a relation is
implied by the Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns to scale
and capital share b. In this case, (2') can be solved explicitly, the minimax
control being given by
(20) u* = (n + a)(k*^''' - .
The time path of the capital-labor ratio is given by
(21) k(t) = (kl-be-(n+a)t +
Table 3 shows the dependence of the minimax saving rate on the population
growth rate plus the technical progress rate, and on the- period of accumulation,
based on (20). Calculations are carried out for the parameter values k^ - 4,
k* = 8, and b = .25. Both increased population growth and a longer period of
accumulation result in a higher minimax saving rate. Note also that for large
13
Table 1. Time paths of,k(t), minimax saving
rt
(I
O
t = 25 t = 50 t = 75 t = 100
b = .25, u* = .026 4 4.93 5.91 6.93 8
h = .5, u* = .017 4 4.87 5.83 6.87 8
b = .75, u* = .011 4 4.81 5.74 6.80 8
Table 2, Dependence of u* on k* and T
(b = .25, k^ = 4)
k*
10
50 .027 .051 .075
100 .013 .026 .037
200 .007 .013 .019
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T, savings rates here are substantially higher than in Table 2. Measurement
in terms of efficiency-units of labor is partly responsible for these results.
A fair average of these cases would appear to be 10%.
The example has been framed in such a way that a direct comparision with
Mirrlees' results [7, pp. 109-112] is possible. The utilitarian asjrmptotic
saving rate is given by (a + n)b/(2a). These values are reflected in the last
column of table 4. The initial savings rates are obtained from Mirrlees'
figure 4, after translating the capital-labor ratio into the capital-output
ratio. Calculations are based on zero population growth, technical progress
at 2%, and = 4. For all values of the .capital share b, utilitarian saving
rates are higher than minimax saving rates. This feature is explained by the
utilitarian target capital-labor ratios, which range from 11.5 (for b = .25) '
to 123596 (for b = .75). The utilitarian paths simply accumulate more capital.
The minimax saving rate, like the utilitarian rates, is quite sensitive to the
value of b; however, whereas the latter increases as b increases, the former
decreases as b increases.
Several contrasts can be drawn between the two examples. First, whereas
population growth and technological change always decrease the utilitarian
savings rate, they increase the minimax savings rate for T S 100. The minimax
savings rate is uniformly lower than the utilitarian savings rate. To some
extent, of course, this is due to the choice of contemporaneous utility func
tion. Taking u(c) = -c with n much larger than 1 lowers the utilitarian
saving rate. While the minimax path reaches its target in finite time, the
utilitarian path reaches its target only asymptotically. Overall, savings
rates currently observed in the developed would appear more justifiable on
minimax than on utilitarian grounds.
15
Table 3. Minimax Saving Rates
II
II
8, b = .25)
T = 50 T = 100 T = 200
01 ,030 .037 .044
02 .074 .087 .094
03 .124 ,138 .142
Table 4. Minimax and Utilitarian
Saving Rates
(a = .02, n = 0, = 4, T = 100)
Minimax Utilitarian
Initial Asymptotic
b = .25 .087 .25 .125
b = .50 .051 .42 .25
b « .75 .030 .48 .375
16
6. Conclusion
This paper has argued that minimax savings rates are a reasonable inter
pretation of Rawls' theory of just saving. In the economic models studied,
the minimax criterion requires an equal savings rate on the part of every
generation, leading to the minimum accumulation of capital consistent with
social justice. The main numerical result is that, if the capital-labor
ratio must be raised 100% in the next century to achieve justice, and if the
Cobb-Douglas production function with capital share 1/4 adequately forecasts
production, then the savings rate should be between 3 and 10%, depending on
the rate of population increase and technical progress. Minimi paths are
seen to be significantly different from typical utilitarian alternatives.
One interesting open problem is whether there exist economic models for
which the minimax path does not lead to a constant savings rate. Certainly,
second-order mdels would make this possible, and perhaps certain time-
dependent production functions as well.
The greatest drawback to the present theory is the determination of the
just capital stock and period of accumulation. In Rawls' theory, these must
be decided in the original position. It seems inevitable that their deter
mination involve the larger question of the social minimum and social
stability. For too high a savings rate, even if equal for all generations,
surely intensifies social tension.
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